Environmental law-making public opinion in Victorian Britain: The cross-currents of Bentham's and Coleridge's ideas by Pontin, Ben
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MAKING OPINION 
DURING THE GREEN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: 
REDEFINING DICEY’S ‘AGES’ OF COLERIDGE 
AND BENTHAM 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is increasingly clear that law and its enforcement in Victorian Britain was quite effective in 
tackling formative industrial environmental problems. What is unclear is the political 
philosophy, if any, underlying this achievement. Dicey‟s analysis of nineteenth century law-
making public opinion with reference to the „age‟ of Coleridge being superseded by that of 
Bentham focused attention on factory safety regulation. It thus ignored exceptionally important 
common law and statutory provisions applicable to industrial pollution and nature conservation, 
through which the first industrial nation (Britain) established itself as the pioneer of modern 
environmental law. Those who have explored this lacuna have argued that environmental laws 
expose a fundamental weakness in Dicey‟s historiography. Environmental statutes, it is claimed, 
show little evidence of being shaped by intellectual ideas of any kind. By contrast, in this article 
it is argued that Victorian-era environmental laws support Dicey‟s thesis of ideas-driven legal 
intervention. However, some adjustment is needed in relation to the ideas that are to be 
understood as being dominant. Contrary to Dicey, the age of Coleridge was not eclipsed by that 
of Bentham; the two co-existed. The principal conduit through which Coleridge‟s organic, 
natural law theory enjoyed its extended afterlife was Disraeli‟s „Young England‟ movement. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that the law offered broadly 
adequate protection of the environment against industrial threats in Victorian 
Britain – the „workshop of the world‟.1 The achievement was in part a function 
of the common law, which dynastic proprietors were willing and able to enforce 
so as to protect flora and fauna on which the value of their estates rested. It also 
depended on parliamentary enactments which laid down „public interest‟ 
standards for the control of pollution affecting air, water and land,
2
 as well as the 
protection of wild (and indeed domesticated) animals.
3
 In these ways the first 
industrial nation (Britain) established itself as the pioneer of a comprehensive 
range of modern environmental laws which cleaned production processes and 
conserved natural landscapes. However, what is unclear is the current(s) of 
philosophical thought underpinning these laws and their positive enforcement 
outcomes, if indeed there is any. Were formative environmental laws the result 
of chance or design, and if design, whose? 
 The question of the existence of a philosophical seam underpinning the 
various laws of the nineteenth century was first raised by A V Dicey in the 
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seminal study of „law making public opinion‟.4 According to Dicey, it is in the 
nature of both common law and statute law that each is shaped by intellectual 
opinion that „arises from individuals; generally at first from some individual‟.5 
Laws of the initial Georgian third of the century are understood by Dicey has 
having reflected the influence of a philosophy of humanitarian conservatism 
which Dicey summed up at one point as the „age of Coleridge‟ (with reference to 
political philosophy of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834)).
6
 Thereafter, the 
Victorian era is considered to have been dominated by the utilitarianism of 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), first in its individualistic variation, and then in its 
collectivist guise.
7
 Nineteenth century environmental law is not touched on in 
Dicey‟s analysis,8 yet there is no reason why the thesis of utilitarianism eclipsing 
Coleridgean conservatism cannot be applied, and tested, in this setting.  
 Historians writing within sub-discipline of „government growth‟ in 
relation to the environment have interpreted Victorian-era law as a fundamental 
challenge to Dicey‟s thesis.9  Environmental law, it is argued, was not shaped by 
the ideas of Bentham or indeed anyone, but rather by the necessity of an 
immediate response to the unforeseen problems arising from steam powered 
industrialisation.
10
  For instance, according to Roy McLeod, fisheries 
conservation legislation was a hasty attempt at reconciling new and old trade 
uses of rivers that consisted of a „series of legislative and administrative 
compromises which exhausted the amateur inspectors, frustrated their scientific 
successors, annoyed fishery interests, and cast unfamiliar problems upon ill-
equipped secretariats‟.11 Alkali legislation, likewise, is portrayed by this 
historian as less a product of grand design than an „admixture of personal 
imagination, difficult goals and internal momentum of administration‟.12 K T 
Hoppen goes as far as to single out this area of legislation as the exemplar of the 
indifference of nineteenth century laws to intellectual ideas.
13
 
Lawyer-historians have tended to share this scepticism towards the 
existence of a philosophical underpinning to nineteenth century environmental 
law. Richard Burnett-Hall qualifies his suggestion that „Britain can be rightly 
proud of the pioneering legislation it introduced in the mid-19th century‟14 by 
pointing to a legacy of „uncoordinated regulation [which] persisted right up to 
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the 1980s‟.15 In the first textbook devoted to the topic of environmental law, 
David Hughes placed the discipline („environmental law‟) in inverted commas 
by virtue of what he considered its unconvincing historical origins.
16
 His 
powerful comment is that Victorian-era environment law was „not a coherent, 
logical body of principles and rules‟.17 Thus it denied modern law a historically 
grounded normative foundation. A recent study on behalf of the United 
Kingdom Environmental Law Association echoes Hughes‟ sentiment that the 
law‟s intellectually banal historical development hampers the present quest (of 
the legislator, practitioner and the public at large) for coherence.
18
 
An important exception to the view that nineteenth century 
environmental law lacks intellectual depth is provided by Sean Coyle and Karen 
Morrow in their book The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law.
19
 
Without explicitly engaging with Dicey‟s schema, this book nevertheless 
promotes a broadly similar intellectual approach to the history of the law which 
is considered by the authors to be tailored around shifting philosophical 
conceptions of property in land. In particular, nineteenth century environmental 
law is understood as the fruit of two contrasting philosophies. First, a natural law 
philosophy in which property reflects a moral view of the limits on the human 
entitlement to exploit the environment (considered to be developed most fully in 
the writing of John Locke). Second a more instrumentalist philosophy, in which 
it is taken for granted that anything that promotes human welfare is necessarily 
good environmentally (e.g Bentham‟s utilitarianism). 
The present article defends this essentially Diceyan approach to 
environmental law‟s nineteenth century past, albeit with some important 
adjustments relating to the identity of the philosophers and their ideas that are to 
be considered most influential. Section 2 examines the idea of Bentham‟s 
influence which is common to both Dicey‟s and Coyle and Morrow‟s accounts. 
It is argued that Bentham was indeed influential, in two distinct ways. First, 
procedurally speaking, through his science of legislation that underpinned the 
voluminous social and environmental inquiry data generated prior to the 
enactment of almost every major piece of statutory environmental law at this 
time. Second, in terms of the content of the law, as Bentham‟s utility calculus 
shaped important details of statute and common law in this field. The 
Benthamism at work here is of the individualist variety, for whilst many of the 
statutory laws involved a degree of centralised control through „expert‟ 
government inspectorates, they are not municipal socialist, as per Dicey‟s 
understanding of Benthamism in its more collectivist facet.
20
  
 Section 3 begins an examination of the extent to which Dicey 
underestimated the lasting influence of the ideas of Coleridge, with reference to 
environmental law. Coyle and Morrow do not engage with Coleridge, but they 
do attach importance to the natural law tradition of which he was part. Crucially, 
they see this tradition as co-existing with the instrumentalism of Bentham‟s 
ideas. The natural law theorist they focus on is  John Locke, whose work is 
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(rightly) seen as offering a zero-waste theory geared around markets that 
resembles what today is called „sustainable development‟.21 But sustainable 
development is different from the „deep green‟ philosophy that Coleridge‟s 
natural law theory encapsulated, as part of a critique of Locke‟s thinking.22 
Three relevant facets of Coleridge‟s philosophy that illustrates this critique of 
Locke are examined in this section, viz: the proto-ecological scientific theory of 
life on earth that emphasises species evolution as a response to habitat; the 
„green‟ liberal idea in which humanity is grounded in a co-operative relationship 
with nature; and a territorial constitutional theory geared around keeping in 
check the potentially harmful capitalistic industrial forces with reference to a 
mixture of counter-balances provided by landed „permanent hereditary senators‟ 
and intellectuals.
23
 
 Section 4 examines the impact of these ideas of Coleridge on 
environmental law of the Victorian period. Disraeli‟s „Young England‟ 
movement is argued to be the chief conduit through which Coleridge‟s ideas 
shaped mid-to-late nineteenth century law. Historians have tended to dismiss 
this „silly ass‟24 group of privileged young men who advocated neo-Chaucerian 
values as a way checking the vulgarity of capitalism as of little importance to the 
development of any area of law.
25
 Yet it is increasingly apparent that the 
movement shaped common law and statutory interventions in the field of the 
environment in at least as large degree as the familiar utilitarian purveyors of 
Bentham‟s ideas.26 This part of the discussion connects with the revisionist 
thesis of David Lloyd Smith,
27
 where it is suggested that „Young Englanders‟, 
led by Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), deployed medieval notions of hierarchy 
descending from the crown to produce a uniquely centralised (Smith does not go 
so far as to suggest environmentally-attuned) brand of property theory geared 
around conservation.  
It is concluded (in section 5) that Bentham‟s and Coleridge‟s ideas 
converged around the cause of environmental protection to provide a diverse and 
resilient philosophical foundation for nineteenth century environmental law. 
That is not to say that the two philosophical streams have proved equally 
enduring, for they have not. It is clear that „age of Coleridge‟ was of a more 
lasting duration than Dicey contemplated, but not indefinitely so. The changing 
political realities of the twentieth century brought a quite abrupt end to the 
romance of environmental law which Young England articulated. This romantic 
tradition today exists as a counter-current rather than a dominant influence. It is 
latent in particular in the „wild law‟ critique of idea of focusing environmental 
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protection around greening the economy.
28
 Wild law promotes a Coleridgean 
idea of the environment as a thing of beauty and deep moral significance, of 
intrinsic value as well as of instrumental value in satisfying human needs.  
 
2. The Utilitarian Dimensions to Nineteenth Century Environmental 
Law 
 
Dicey formulated his concept of „law-making opinion‟ as applicable to statute 
and common law.
29
 The critique of his analysis within the „government growth‟ 
literature typically overlooks this in focusing exclusively on purported problems 
with Dicey‟s account of statutory regulation. Parliament‟s interventions did not 
at this time replace common law, but operated alongside of unmodified judge-
made rules. Indeed, environmental law is one of the best illustrations of Dicey‟s 
legal pluralism and thus an excellent test of his thesis. By way of illustration, the 
enforcement of the common law of nuisance functioned to stimulate investment 
in clean technology which, in turn, made it feasible for parliament to enact 
legislation putting clean technology on a statutory footing.
30
 The value of Coyle 
and Morrow‟s study is that it recognises the reciprocal context that common law 
and statute provided one another, and also the diversity of the philosophical 
ideas shaping these legal interventions (albeit within a constraint that is 
discussed in later regarding the role of what is argued to be the pivotal ideas of 
Coleridge).  
This section examines the influence of the ideas of Bentham. Coyle and 
Morrow share common ground with Dicey in this respect, in acknowledging 
Bentham as a major influence on mid-Victorian era law. Coyle and Morrow see 
Bentham as supplying the philosophical justification for legislative remedies for 
environmental problems insofar as these problems were an obstacle to delivering 
„the greatest happiness‟. The Alkali Acts imposed controls on the chemical 
industry aimed at protecting vegetation in the vicinity of works on the basis that 
a population depended on „greenery‟ for food, clothing, fuel and shelter. Another 
example is that of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, which was aimed at 
making rivers more useful to many aspects of the population by removing solid 
and liquid pollution. Public health legislation (notably the Public Health Act 
1875) was aimed at tackling other causes of insanitary conditions which 
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threatened human health, particularly in growing towns and cities. This section 
elaborates on Bentham‟s role in the process and substance of the law. 
Regarding process, the statutes mentioned immediately above were the 
upshot of social scientific inquiry on a grand scale and epitomise Bentham‟s 
ideal of measured legislation based on facts.
31
 The House of Lords Select 
Committee on Noxious Vapours 1862 derived its recommendations for alkali 
legislation from ten sessions of oral testimony given by 48 important witnesses 
drawn from landowning, manufacturing, and scientific ranks.
32
 That produced 
240 pages of transcribed testimony which was made open to the public to assure 
everyone interested that law reform was evidence-based. The Royal Commission 
on Noxious Vapours 1878 was more painstaking still in its coverage of data. 
This heard evidence over a period of fifteen months,
33
 during which 198 
witnesses answered a total of 14,205 questions, generating 561 pages of 
transcribed oral testimony.
34
 The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act was based on 
no less than five major public inquiries.
35
 By contrast, the Sea Birds Protection 
Act 1869 was the product of moral outrage, but that was exceptional.
36
  
 In terms of the substantive content of the law (on which critics of 
Dicey‟s idea of a Benthamite influence focus), it is not at all clear that historians 
of Victorian-era bureaucracy have been right to dismiss the role of Bentham‟s 
ideas in relation to alkali legislation. McLeod‟s argument that Alkali Acts „owed 
little or nothing to the ideological discussions of the Benthamites‟37 cites in 
support an article in The Times where it is reported that „Chadwickians‟ (read 
Benthamites) were hostile to this area of statutory intervention.
38
 Yet the same 
paper at a similar time suggested that utilitarianism was pivotal to those who 
campaigned for this legislation. Lord Stanley (later the 15
th
 Earl Derby) was the 
lead campaigner, who The Times considered „inclined to the side of what is 
commonly called utilitarianism and laissez faire‟:39  
 
He [Lord Derby] takes by preference the economic and common sense 
view of public questions and he is, perhaps, the man in all England who 
is least likely to propose any measures which would embarrass our 
manufacturers for the sake of preserving or restoring the beauty of the 
landscape in Lancashire and Cheshire. 
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 In similar terms the specialist chemical industry press praised the „hard-headed‟ 
regulatory approach of the Chief Inspector of the Alkali Acts, Angus Smith.
40
 
The contrast being drawn is with the „sentimental‟ ideology of romantics, and 
implicitly the ideas of Coleridge discussed later. 
 Utilitarian influences were not confined to pollution control legislation. 
Additionally they extended to certain aspects of nature conservation legislation 
and the welfare of animals more generally. In the Principles of Penal Law, 
Bentham anticipated that „the time will come when humanity will extend its 
mantle over everything which breathes‟.41 The Sea Birds Preservation Act 1869 
is a formative wild species protection measure that criminalised the shooting of 
over thirty species of sea bird during the breeding season.  A romantically 
inclined moral outrage concerning the destruction of „nature beauty‟ that owed 
nothing to Benthamism lay behind the campaign for the Act.
42
 But its passage 
through Parliament was eased by utilitarian arguments concerning the usefulness 
of sea birds to humankind. It was reasoned that sea birds helped sustain fisheries 
and also protected shipping interests (assisting with coastal navigation).
43
 Later 
extensions of this legislation emphasised the utility of wild birds as controllers 
of insect populations (and thus of value from an agricultural perspective).
44
 
  A final group of utilitarian influences on the substance of law worthy of 
elaboration concerns relevant common law. Every statute mentioned above was 
premised on the limitations of the common law in delivering the consistent and 
widely accessible measure of environmental protection that utility demanded. 
However, the pertinent point is not that Bentham favoured code over common 
law (which he clearly did); rather, that the common law survived through 
embracing utilitarian ideas at crucial junctures. Consider for example how 
judges exercised their discretion to award a nuisance injunction on a suspended 
basis.
45
  The „jurisprudence‟ here was that suspension to an injunction would 
give the defendant time to adopt, and if necessary invent, a considered mode of 
compliance with common law‟s neighbourhood obligations, rather than close 
down, relocate or indeed do anything in haste (which may result in a net loss to 
utility). For example, the injunction awarded to Sir Charles Bowyer Adderley in 
AG v Birmingham
46
 requiring Birmingham Corporation to cease the disposal of 
raw sewage into the River Tame The injunction appeared on its surface a „drastic 
measure‟ which was indifferent to „public misery‟.47 Yet by virtue of the use of 
suspensions the court ultimately reconciled the welfare of Adderley and the 
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20,000 residents of his estate with that of the town and its need for drainage to 
cater for a quarter of a million citizens.
48
  
A further noteworthy utilitarian aspect to the common law concerns the 
dictum in Tipping regarding amenity nuisance being defined with reference to 
the character of the neighbourhood.
49
 Industry was attracted to the idea that 
pollution was defined with reference to its local context. A contrast was drawn 
with the more rigid statutory code: 
 
The most unsatisfactory feature in the „Alkali Works Regulation Act‟ is 
that its provisions are equally stringent in all places. A person who 
should start some offensive manufacture in the midst of the hop gardens 
of Kent, in the Isle of Wight, at Bournemouth, or Ilfracome, would 
encounter no more severe regulations than if he went to work where all 
vegetation had been extirpated, or where there are no inhabitants to 
complain.
50
 
 
Here it is the common law that is being portrayed as utilitarian, in juxtaposition 
to a dogmatic statutory scheme. 
 Coyle and Morrow make the crucial point that utilitarianism did not treat 
environmental protection as of „intrinsic‟ value.51 It is clear that the above 
justifications for law are largely directed at securing environmental protection 
„only‟ insofar as it is useful to people or, put with difference emphasis, where 
environmental harm got in the way of human happiness.
52
 In this respect Coyle 
and Morrow draw a contrast between utilitarian and natural law theory. Natural 
law is understood as a tradition of legal philosophy which engages with the 
physical environment as something worthy of protection in its own right. John 
Locke (1632-1704) is seen developing „intrinsic environmental law‟ to its most 
sophisticated extent within this philosophical framework. Particular significance 
is attached to Locke‟s assault on waste, as expressed in the aphorism that 
„nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy‟.53 In the section that 
follows, it is argued that there is a deeper green strain of natural law theory.  
  
 
3. ‘Deep’ Environmentalism within the ‘Age of Coleridge’ 
 
Coyle and Morrow are interested in natural law theory as supplying the 
normative foundation for those instances where environmental law „sometimes 
exceeded a purely instrumental approach‟.54 Modern terminology is used by 
                                                 
48
 Through the use of periodic suspensions to the injunction, the defendant corporation was given 
a window of thirty seven years to invent a satisfactory means of providing a service for 
townsfolk without destroying property in the countryside. Pontin (2013), n 1. 
49
 See the distinction between amenity nuisance and property damage mooted obiter in Tipping v 
St Helens Smelting Ltd (1865) 11 HLC 642 and applied to the ratio in Sturges v Birdgman (1879) 
LR 11 Ch D 852.  Of course, the result of these authorities is that physical damage to property is 
actionable in any circumstance, regardless of wider utility, and this is one of a number of aspects 
of the common law.  
50
 Chemical News, December 26 1884, 307. 
51
 n 19, 109. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid, 64. 
54
 Ibid, 109 
these scholars to explain Locke‟s relevant position, as follows. Locke is 
understood as advancing an early form of „sustainable development‟ which 
embraces economic growth within environmental constraints.
55
 No-one from 
roughly this period is identified as promoting a deeper green, „steady state‟ 
approach where the environment is protected not simply as a material resource 
but for „non-material‟ reasons .56 Yet in Coleridge‟s ideas we can discern a deep 
green paradigm of considerable originality, sophistication and, as explained in a 
later section, enormous practical influence.
57
  
 My suggestion that Coleridge is a thinker of philosophical stature 
pertinent to environmental law must be situated in the context of a more general 
revisionist literature relating to this man of ideas, beginning in the 1920s with 
the study of Coleridge by the idealist philosopher John Henry Muirhead.
58
 
Muirhead set out an appreciation of the „multifarious and miraculous‟ writing of 
Coleridge on the meaning of life and of humankind‟s place on earth that went 
against the grain of opinion at this time (which did not hold in esteem the 
thought of Coleridge). Lots of philosophical literature relating to Coleridge‟s 
writing has subsequently been published in this vein, but it is only recently that 
the significance of Coleridge‟s political philosophy for law has received 
sustained scholarly treatment. In particular, Pamela Edwards monograph depicts 
Coleridge as an organic natural law theorist of unsurpassed rigour and 
originality.
59
  This is not a work that was available to Coyle and Morrow for it 
was published in the same year as Philosophical Foundations. It serves to 
highlight a natural law tradition that is critical of Locke‟s shallow engagement 
with nature which is central to the present concerns.
60
   
Three aspects of Coleridge‟s organic natural law theory are examined in 
this section (later to be explored for their impact on environmental law). First, 
the proto-ecological scientific idea of life on earth as the product of evolution in 
response to habitat. Second, the green liberal idea that the wellbeing of the 
individual is defined by a co-operative relationship with nature. Third, the neo-
territorial constitutional idea of a „steady state‟ in which capitalist interests in 
material progress are balanced against „non-material‟ values of „permanence‟ 
promoted by trustees of landed estates, intellectuals and theologians. These 
interlocking ideas are quite different from those of Bentham (and indeed Locke) 
but need not be understood as inconsistent with them. Rather, as J S Mill 
explained, Coleridge articulated ideas that complemented others.
61
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Coleridge’s Ecological Theorising 
 
After graduation from Cambridge University, Coleridge was a major part of the 
Pneumatics Institute of the Clifton and Hotwells district of Bristol.
62
 For a year 
he lived under the roof of medic-landlord (and founder of the Institute) Thomas 
Beddoes. Beddoes housed Coleridge and a wider group of what Mike Jay has 
evocatively described as Britain‟s „sons of genius‟. Erasmus Darwin (1731-
1802), Humphry Davy (1778-1829), and James Watt (1736-1819) were among 
those who worked with Coleridge within this setting on fields of natural 
scientific inquiry of one kind and another. Coleridge was recognised by his peers 
as the most energetic, informed, and inspirational member of the institute, and 
indeed the scientific question he posed was the most ambitious imaginable. 
What could the totality of science teach us about the meaning of life on earth? In 
that endeavour he combined an interest in biology (Beddoes had just coined the 
term),
63
 zoology, botany, geology, physics as well as chemistry. 
 
Coleridge‟s scientific ideas were developed in 1816 into a major 
synthesis, Hints Towards a More Comprehensive Theory of Life.
64
 This 
combined the insights he had gained from his Clifton experience with lessons 
from his later sabbatical in Germany (when he collaborated with leading 
continental philosophers of nature).
65
 A distinctive feature of Coleridge‟s 
thought in this work is its rejection of any appeal to a primordial „state of nature‟ 
popular throughout Europe at the time.
66
 According to Coleridge, humankind 
does not rise from, or lead into, a natural state; rather, it evolves, and continually 
so. Life is the moment-to-moment fruit of perpetual change within complex 
parameters provided by the earth as a whole. More specifically, life arises from 
interactions among organisms, chemicals, minerals, and magnetic forces.
67
  
 Coleridge‟s theory of evolution has been plausibly considered an early 
contribution to ecological theory.
68
 Humans are depicted in nascent ecological 
fashion as part of a „multeity‟ characterising a „union of opposites‟.69  
Vegetables, insects and animals are classes of living being whose identity is 
defined by a process of individuation, in an oppositional dynamic that is 
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applicable to all organisms, „from molluscs to man‟.70 The mollusc is prominent 
in the work of Karl Mobius, whose „Biocoenose‟ (depicting evolution of oysters 
in response to habitat) is considered by some to provide the modern origins of 
the science of ecology.
71
 Coleridge‟s influence on Mobius is unclear, but what is 
clear is that he was a considerable influence on two of the most celebrated mid-
Victorian scientists, Richard Owen and Charles Darwin (the son of Erasmus).
72
 
 The extent to which Coleridge‟s theory is to be understood as a break 
from the Christian stewardship doctrine of Matthew Hale (1609-1676) is 
uncertain.
73
 Erasmus Darwin considered that Coleridge‟s Christian reflections 
disguised a brilliantly radical, godless view of evolution which was quite distinct 
from anything that would have occurred to Hale.
74
 However, Coleridge did not 
see God as a superstition (as did Darwin). Rather, he embraced what Davy called 
the „meta-metaphysical‟ idea that there is a divine order within natural life.75  
This brought Coleridge closer to Hale‟s view than would otherwise have been 
the case.  Each shared a view of humans as moral agents, guided by spirituality, 
with a noble responsibility for the consequences of actions within the wider 
order.
76
 Coleridge and Hale thus occupy a place on the spectrum of Christian 
stewardship thought.
 77
 Spirituality is as crucial as natural science to Coleridge‟s 
influence in the field of environmental law. 
  
Coleridge’s ‘green’ liberalism 
 
Coleridge advanced a theory of what can be termed „green‟ liberalism 
principally through the medium of poetry. Poetry is not the typical material of 
the scholar of political philosophy, less still the scholar of law, but the scholar of 
Coleridge has no choice but to engage with this medium. Coleridge did not 
consider it was possible to express his „deep‟ ideas in any other literary form. 
„Poetry‟, Coleridge once said, is „the best words in the best order‟.78 His belief 
was that poetry gave access to truths about nature that were beyond prose. As 
Percy Shelley later observed in connection with romantic poets more generally, 
the perceived force of poetry was bound up with that of „reverie‟: 
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 Those who are subject to a state called reverie, feel as if their nature were 
dissolving into the surrounding universe, or as if the surrounding 
universe were absorbed into their being. They are conscious of no 
distinction.
79
 
 
This section focuses on the articulation of deep truths about mankind‟s 
relationship with nature in Coleridge‟s poetic work. 
 By contrast to Locke, Coleridge took it as given that humankind 
depended on nature for „material‟ sustenance (for food, shelter, clothing, fuel, 
transport, defence). That was Locke‟s preoccupation, but it is considered trite by 
Coleridge. More significant is the subtle contribution of nature to „non-material‟ 
aspects of humanity - emotionally, intellectually, spiritually, and politically. A 
helpful starting point is the extraordinary poem „Eolian Harp‟ (an early 
composition of 1795). In this poem Coleridge contextualised his loving feelings 
for a woman (Sara Fricker, whom he was later to marry and have four children) 
in relation to his feelings towards the earth as a whole. The lover and the loved 
are „one Life‟.80 This holism is reflected in the sounds of the eponymous wind 
instrument playing in the background of the domestic scene:  
 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely framed, 
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?
81
  
 
Oswald Doughty aptly describes these difficult lines as expressing a „rare fusion 
of reflective thought and sensitivity to peaceful nature beauty‟.82  
Published in 1798, „The Nightingale‟ approaches the liberal significance 
of nature beauty from the different perspective of those who (mistakenly) see 
nature as enslaving of humans.
83
 The poem re-defines the song of the 
nightingale, traditionally treated as melancholy, as a source of joy (which 
„gladdens green earth‟).84 The message is that everywhere in nature there is 
something positive for the individual. This is repeated in „Frost at Midnight‟ 
(again written in 1798).  The poem tells the story of the poet‟s wakeful infant 
son, Hartley. His experience of anguish is eased by the looking up at the moon 
and its lunar light cast over the land. Coleridge depicts himself as a „child of 
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nature‟ who can empathise with his son, and expresses the hope that his son will 
be retain this affinity for nature.
85
  
Beyond the family unit, nature beauty is understood by Coleridge as 
being inextricably linked with political liberty and the institutions of a free 
society. „France: An Ode‟ (another composition of 1798) contrasts the political 
architecture created to liberate a (French) people with the protagonist‟s 
experience of personal liberty within an alpine mountain-scape. The liberty 
aspired to by French revolutionaries is realised as superficial when compared to 
the authentic liberty the protagonist derived from communing with nature. „Oh 
Liberty, my spirit felt thee there!‟, is the rousing denouement of this work which 
can fill the reader‟s mind with the liberating sensation of high-altitude air.86 
Lucy Newlyn is convincing in her interpretation of this poem as one that „re-
defines liberty in terms of the mind‟s harmonious interaction with the natural 
world‟.87 
The poem „To a Young Ass‟ (a very early composition, of 1794) 
addresses the important matter of inter-species relations. This is a comic 
composition, which treats the equine subject as the poet‟s equal. Nevertheless, it 
connects with the quite serious political scheme Coleridge and Robert Southey 
hatched of communal living embracing all the beings within the world. The two 
coined the name for this of „pantisocracy‟.88 „I call even my Cat Sister in the 
Fraternity of universal Nature‟, wrote Coleridge, to illustrate the meaning of 
pantisocracy and its comedy.
 89
 Bentham and Coleridge shared some common 
ground here. They each embraced to idea of animal suffering, in a dismissal of 
Cartesian materialism.
90
 Yet Coleridge went far deeper into this idea of a 
universal community of species. He did not stop, as did Bentham, at extending 
the fraternity to all sentient beings (capable of feeling pain).  
Predators exist in this „Fraternity‟, but the process of predation is benign, 
or at least it is when it is structured through a natural law provision which 
Coleridge expresses in the maxim: „all creatures obey the great game-laws of 
Nature, and fish with nets of such meshes as permit many to escape, and 
preclude the taking of many.
91
 There are elements of Locke‟s zero waste theory 
in this,
 92
 but Coleridge is not simply concerned with conserving material 
resources across generations. He is concerned with mental well being of the 
individual and its dependence on a co-operative relationship with nature. The 
poem „The Rime of the Ancient Mariner‟ (yet another of Coleridge‟s 1798 opus) 
illustrates as well as any this point that nature for Coleridge is food for thought. 
It begins with a sailor shooting a sea bird (an albatross) in a gratuitous, 
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impulsive act of nature harm.
93
  That is followed by an imagined environmental 
catastrophe. The ship is beset by foul mist, wind changes and scorching heat. 
Mutant animals („slimy things did crawl with legs‟)94 emerged from polluted 
water („The water, like a witch‟s oils/ Burnt green, and blue, then white‟).95  
This is of course redolent of the water environment Tocqueville and 
Engels were to separately describe relating to early Victorian Manchester, whilst 
Coleridge‟s concern with climate change and hideous species mutation readily 
resonates with anxieties of the present day in relation to the Climate Change Act 
2008 and the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Part VI). However, Coleridge 
is not describing a real environmental catastrophe, or otherwise a prophesy of 
one in future. The pollution referred to in the poem is a reflection of mental 
breakdown occasioned by neglect of nature and its beauty. Wanton injury to 
nature is a bad idea; it is wrong. A person who carelessly harms nature may end 
up in a state of despair (like Coleridge‟s mariner).96 
 
Neo-Territorial Constitutional Theory 
 
Coleridge‟s third pertinent area of thought relates to the ideal constitutional 
arrangements for a society that co-operates with nature. This is the subject of a 
late work – one of his most celebrated - called On the Constitution of Church 
and State.
97
 The work is a defence of a mixed constitutional settlement involving 
power being shared between the trustees of leading family estates, the capitalists 
who leased land from these estates, the intellectuals who worked in churches and 
universities, and the population at large through a degree of electoral 
representation. Rather like Dicey was to attempt a generation later, Coleridge in 
this work constructs an idea of „constitution‟ with reference to first principles.98 
Coleridge approached the constitution as existing as an idea, comprising 
principles which are comprehensible to actors, and which are reflected in laws.
 99
  
 The central principle identified by Coleridge is that of „equipoise‟ or 
„equilibrium‟. This is with respect to the balancing of the two most fundamental 
competing interests within any given modern civilization, namely, those 
associated with „permanence‟ and those with „progression‟: 
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 Now, in every country of civilized men, acknowledging the rights of 
property, and by means of determined boundaries and common laws 
united into one people or nation, the two antagonist powers or opposite 
interests of the state, under which all other state interests are comprised, 
are those of PERMENANCE and PROGRESSION.
100
 
 
Coleridge is here applying the polarised method noted above in connection with 
his theory of life.
101
 The idea of a constitution is to mediate between these 
extremes, to guard against too much progress (which is a threat in an 
industrialising society), as much as too little of it (which is a threat in an agrarian 
society). 
Coleridge conceives of the opposing interests as having their institutional 
reflection within an ideal bicameral legislature.
102
 Permanence is an interest that 
is promoted through a hereditary chamber consisting of substantial, ancestral 
proprietors of land.
103
 Under the illustrative British constitution, peers within the 
House of Lords occupy the position Coleridge referred to as „permanent 
hereditary senators‟.104 This is by virtue of their connection with landed estates 
that are regarded by Coleridge „as offices of trust‟.105 Youthful Coleridge 
advocated trust-based conceptions of property in land of a different kind, 
inspired by Hebrew constitutionalism.
106
 Later Coleridge promoted a 
hierarchical trust-based conception of property in contrast to his early levelling 
thought. It is clear that he came to broadly accept the idea fostered by the 
arisocracy „that the owner of an estate for the time being was steward of a trust 
for unborn generations and a temporary recipient of the fruits of his forbears‟ 
endeavours.‟107 
The competing interest in progress is associated with commerce and 
industry. Representatives from this „interest grouping‟ are seen as suitably 
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contained in a second, elected legislative chamber.
 108
 Within the context of the 
British constitution, Coleridge sees an ideal House of Commons as comprising 
minor hereditary landed interests alongside a multiplicity of „personal interests‟ 
– „the [elected] representatives of the commercial, manufacturing, distributive, 
and professional classes‟.109 Coleridge does not rule out a wide franchise in 
respect of this chamber. However, he substantially departs from Bentham (who 
advocated universal adult suffrage on a yearly electoral cycle) in his advocacy of 
a broader bicameralism in which an unelected chamber limits what the elected 
chamber can achieve.
110
 Bentham, on Coleridge‟s scheme, lacked adequate 
respect for the interest in permanence; he was too eager for change and not 
sufficiently mindful of the price of change.  
 There is on Coleridge‟s scheme a third institution, given a name which 
he coined of „Clerisy‟.111 The role of this institution, whose members comprise 
scholars and church people, is to act as the „beam of the scales‟.112 In one of the 
most famous passages of Church and State, its function is expressed as follows: 
 
to preserve the stores, to guard the treasures, of past civilization, and thus 
to bind the present with the past; to perfect and add to the same, and thus 
to connect the present with the future; but especially to diffuse through 
the whole community, and to every native entitled to its laws and rights, 
that quantity and quality of knowledge which is indispensible both for 
the understanding of those rights, and for the performance of the duties 
correspondent.
113
 
 
Raymond Williams places emphasis on „guarding the treasures of the past‟ in 
what he interprets as a critique of a world increasingly dominated by the 
„dehumanising‟ claims of capital. However, for our purposes it is important to 
note that Coleridge‟s clerisy is concerned equally with avoiding too little 
progress. It is not reactionary, in the sense of anti-industry, or in opposition to 
material advancement. Rather, it is about striking a balance, guarding against 
dominance of the materialism of capitalist industry without denying the palpable 
importance of material things in life. 
 Coleridge‟s commitment to the balance between permanence and 
progress is well illustrated by his writing on the subject of the legal regulation of 
working conditions in factories. Coleridge did not consider that there was 
anything intrinsically wrong with producing goods in factories on a larger scale 
than the cottage industries of antiquity.
114
 What he objected to was an overly 
commercial approach to the management of factories in which the pursuit of 
material self-interest was assumed to be inherently conducive to public welfare. 
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According to Coleridge, by „look[ing] at all things through the medium of the 
market…to estimate the worth of all pursuits and attainments by their 
marketable value‟,115 society would become poorer and less equal. Coleridge 
resisted „a contemptible democratical oligarchy of glib economists‟116 which he 
saw Adam Smith and the wider Manchester School espousing. 
Coleridge thus disagreed with laissez faire objections to factory 
legislation and was so articulate in his support of statutory intervention that 
Robert Peel looked to him to rescue the Factory Bill of 1818 from Smith‟s 
Manchester School criticisms. Coleridge‟s pivotal extra-parliamentary 
contribution is discussed by biographer Richard Holmes.
117
 Coleridge‟s 
intervention consisted of three polemics in defence of the principle of criminal-
administration regulation of factory conditions.
118
 „The Grounds of Peel‟s Bill 
Vindicated‟, the third of the trilogy, is summarised by Holmes as follows: 
 
This was largely a briefing paper, clarifying and summarizing the 
medical conditions in the cotton factories, much of it hidden away in a 
Commons Select Committee report of 1816…It is not literary, but it is 
impressive in its detail, covering the specifics of shop floor temperatures 
(up to 85 degrees), air pollution, and recorded diseases among children 
(debility, rickets, scrofula, mesentic obstruction). It is notable for the 
„eminent medical authorities‟ it cites, including several doctors that 
Coleridge knew personally…119 
 
This is possibly the only occasion that Coleridge explicitly mentioned industrial 
pollution. Even here, the issue is touched on in passing, and not as of intrinsic 
importance. That has been interpreted as a symbol of Coleridge‟s quiescence 
regarding environmental problems.
120
 But it is more likely a reflection of the fact 
that revolutionary environmental problems had not clearly presented themselves 
during Coleridge‟s lifetime.121 His achievement was not to have campaigned for 
environmental law, but to have supplied a multi-layered philosophical 
justification for future law (when industrialisation became environmentally 
harmful). 
  
 
4. The Coleridgean Dimension to Nineteenth Century Environmental 
law: the role of ‘Young England’ 
 
This section examines the Young England movement as the chief conduit 
through which Coleridge‟s ideas were disseminated with respect to 
environmental law when, beginning in the 1840s, industrial environmental 
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problems presented themselves on a significant scale. The movement was 
founded in the 1840s by three twenty-something aristocrats, Lord John Manners 
(1818-1906),
122
 George Smythe (1818-1857)
123
 and Alexander Baillie-Cochrane 
(1816-1890).
124
 They were led by Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), the litterateur-
politician who hailed from a family of intellectuals who moved in Coleridge‟s 
circles. Robert Blake describes Disraeli‟s philosophy as Coleridgean:125 
 
Though superficial in comparison, Disraeli belongs to the same strand of 
nineteenth century thought as Coleridge...romantic, conservative, 
organic...who revolted against Bentham‟. 
 
The revolt created a cleft within early Victorian Britain in which: 
 
the idealization of material growth and technical innovation that had 
been emerging received a check, and was more and more pushed back by 
contrary ideals of stability, tranquility, closeness to the past, and 
„nonmaterialism‟.126  
 
The Young England movement led this counter-revolutionary influence, helping 
shape seminal environmental laws. 
Fellow Young Englanders did not place as much emphasis as Disraeli on 
environmental protection.
127
 First through the medium of public health, and then 
as a concern in its own right, Disraeli steered Young England into the legal 
protection of nature beauty from the threats of industry and industrial towns and 
cities. In regard to the public health aspect of environmental well-being, Disraeli 
joined with utilitarians to form the Health of Towns Association in 1844. This 
was established under the direction of Thomas Southwood Smith (the 
Benthamite who oversaw the preservation of Bentham‟s body for posterity).128 
Benthamites and Young England put aside deeper philosophical differences to 
attack as complacent existing patrician local health structures and to secure 
implementation of Chadwick‟s proposed sanitary reforms. The fruit of this 
campaign was the Public Health Act 1848.
129
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From this platform in public health legislation Disraeli developed a more 
ambitious concern with intrinsically environmental matters. The Young 
Englander who collaborated with Disraeli to shape important early developments 
here was Sir Charles Bowyer Adderley (1818-1905).
130
 Adderley was the 
proprietor of the Hams Hall estate (and the claimant in the Birmingham sewage 
case mentioned above). He was lampooned in the radical-liberal political press 
as „always a day behind the world‟.131 This was based on his open expression of 
a belief in the aristocracy as the nation‟s moral leaders. „[H]ow I longed to 
lounge by myself at Hams, and on summer days to be at home on the river, then 
clear as crystal!‟, wrote Adderley, in a diary entry which explains both the 
romantic motivation behind the nuisance litigation and the aversion to it of 
Birmingham‟s petit bourgeoisie.132 However, there was ultimately nothing 
reactionary about the outcome of the litigation, which resulted in the invention 
of a world-pioneering infrastructure for the purification of sewage.
133
  
Dicey acknowledges in rather disparaging terms the aristocracy‟s 
aesthetic objections to the industrial bourgeoisie and the distaste for industrial 
development on the basis of its ugliness.
134
 Likewise, the liberal press mocked 
the sentimentality of Adderley‟s care for the aesthetics of his private estate, 
dismissing him as a figure who had nothing to offer a progressive Parliament.
135
 
Indeed, as a statesman he has been dismissed in one modern historical work as 
„simply incompetent‟.136 Yet in his parliamentary career he founded the Colonial 
Reform Society, which promoted self-governance of colonies and an end to 
transportation.
137
 He sponsored some of the earliest state education legislation 
aimed at giving disadvantaged children the opportunity to fulfil their 
potential.
138
 In the present field of statutory environmental policy and law his 
contribution was particularly important. He was the President of the Board of 
Health overseeing the Public Health Act 1848.
139
 He chaired the celebrated 
Royal Sanitary Commission (which sat between 1868-1871), making wide-
ranging recommendation for health and environmental law reform. He 
sponsored the Public Health Act 1872 (which contained provisions dealing with 
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rivers pollution). And he contributed to the relevant lexicon in inventing the 
terms „local government‟,140 and „town and country planning‟.141  
It was Adderley who briefed Disraeli on his „memorable Conservative 
promise‟ delivered at a speech in Manchester in 1872, entitled „Sanitas 
Sanitatum; Onmia Sanitas’: 142 
 
The first consideration of a Minister should be the health of the people 
[defined as] pure air, pure water, the inspection of unhealthy habitations, 
[of] the adulteration of food. 
 
Pure air and pure water were aspirations which accorded with the increasingly 
romantic spirit of the age, and Disraeli‟s leadership on these matters (with 
Adderley‟s help) was politically astute. Indeed, it is this maneuvering which is 
considered by Weintraub to have been the most important factor in the Tory 
Party‟s election victory in 1874. The main legislative fruit of the collaboration 
between Adderley and Disraeli in this period was the Rivers Pollution 
Prevention Act 1876. This was based on the recommendation of the Royal 
Sanitary Commission, which Disraeli had appointed (under Adderley‟s 
chairmanship) in his first administration (in 1868).
143
 The original House of 
Lords Bill of 1875 was withdrawn in the face of industry opposition in the 
House of Commons,
144
 but it was soon enacted with amendment, as a flagship 
measure of Disraeli‟s second administration (1874-1880). 
The 1876 Act has been dismissed by historians of environmental law as a 
legislative failure.
145
 There was indeed some concern at the concessions made to 
industry, but Disraeli‟s biographer (Buckle) describes it nonetheless as an 
innovative measure having „the object of preserving the bounty of nature free 
and uncontaminated for the people‟s enjoyment‟.146 Blake, for the same reason, 
describes the Act as „important‟.147 Crucially, Disraeli himself saw it as a major 
test of his Young England political philosophy, and prioritized its 
enforcement.
148
 For example, a government circular was issued to local authority 
enforcement bodies as to their new responsibilities under the Act. A number of 
prosecutions were authorized by Disraeli‟s Attorney-General (Sir John Holker 
QC). Perhaps most important of all, a collateral policy of not authorizing 
expenditure on sewage infrastructure without satisfactory pollution mitigation 
measures was adopted.
149
 
In other fields of environmental law Disraeli found different aristocratic 
allies. In the arena of Alkali legislation, he principally collaborated with the 
dynastic Stanley family. Edward Smith-Stanley (14
th
 Earl Derby) and his son 
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Edward Henry Stanley (Lord Stanley, later the 15
th
 Earl) were the catalysts for 
initial statutory intervention and subsequent reform in this field. The first Alkali 
Act of 1863 was sponsored by Lord Stanley, following recommendations of his 
father‟s House of Lords Select Committee (the 15 Earl was its chair). It was an 
unprecedented measure in reflecting Parliament‟s recognition of the intrinsic 
value of protection of rural vegetation from revolutionarily polluting industry (in 
ways that are discussed below). But the Act was also tentative in that it was 
time-limited (for five years) and confined to pollution of one environmental 
medium (air) from one polluting industry (utilizing the Leblanc chemical 
process). Disraeli‟s crucial contribution was - in his first administration of less 
than a year - to have found enough space to secure the Alkali Renewal Act 1868, 
which put this intervention on a permanent footing. And within months of 
Disraeli‟s second administration, the Act was extended to encompass a broader 
range of air pollutants and industrial processes (Alkali Act 1874). Towards the 
middle of this second administration Disraeli appointed the Royal Commission 
on Noxious Vapours to consider the case for a radical extension of the Act‟s 
coverage.
150
 
The Royal Commission provided the recommendations on which basis 
the Alkali and Works etc Act 1881 was enacted by Gladstone‟s Liberal Party 
administration, with cross-party support.
151
 The term „intrinsic‟ is used above in 
relation to the environmental dimension to these enactments. Its meaning is 
conveyed by a comment in „The Times‟ relating to the 15th Earl of Derby‟s 
justification for these measures:
152
 
 
The sanitary and the economical consequences of this state of things are 
frightful enough, but most people will agree with Lord Derby that as to 
the moral effect there is „also something to be said‟. When it can be 
asserted by a sober man that „the whole natural beauty of the country is 
destroyed‟ and that „it is disfigured to a hideous degree‟ we cannot refuse 
to agree with him „that a man who can neither grow a flower in his 
garden nor keep a foul stench out of his house is not in circumstances to 
increase that civilization which one would like the see among the poorest 
classes of this country‟. 
 
This is one of the clearest expressions of the influence of Coleridge‟s idea of 
„nature beauty‟ as a moral (as well as aesthetic) construct.  
 Clearer still is the expression of the Coleridgean idea of nature beauty 
underlying the first Sea Birds Protection Act 1869. The background to this Act is 
that in the 1860s, hats for women came increasingly back into fashion, with 
incredible plumage from wild birds adorning the latest in female millinery haute 
and indeed petite couture. That placed a strain on the migratory bird population, 
but a greater threat still came from the contemporary pastime of urban men 
taking weekend summer train excursions to the coast to shoot sea birds.
153
 
Dozens of species of birds which were at risk found an ally in naturalists, 
clergymen and landowners who, in 1868, formed the Sea Birds Preservation 
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Association (out of which the Royal Society for the Protection of the Birds later 
emerged).  
The tone of moral outrage is captured most powerfully in a early peom 
written by Reverend Richard Wilton, entitled „A Plea for the Sea Birds‟: 
 
Stay now thine hand 
Proclaim not man‟s dominion 
Over God‟s works, by strewing rocks and sand 
With sea birds blood-stained plumes and  
   broken pinion.
154
 
 
Wilton justified statutory regulation „for the birds‟ sake‟155 and „for God‟s 
sake‟,156 contrasting the inauthentic „beauty‟ of plumage couture with that of 
plumage in its god-given avian setting.  That distinctly Coleridgean synthesis of 
aesthetics, morality and spirituality lay behind the „masterly‟157 Sea Birds 
Preservation Act. The Act was the beginning of much legislation of this kind. 
The portrayal of the Young England movement as a major influence on 
an important area of law in these respects departs from that offered by much of 
the historical literature. E T Raymond set the dismissive tone of the orthodox 
interpretation of the impact of the movement in his claim that Young England 
„left no mark on the statute book. It produced no definitive effect on the course 
of social development‟.158 Blake conceded that the movement influenced 
Disraeli, but was disparaging of the way in which it was „mixed up with a good 
deal of ecclesiastical flummery, medieval bric-a-brac and gothic rubbish‟.159 
Others have cursorily disposed of the movement as „nonsense‟,160 or plain 
„silly‟.161 The history of environmental law is a major problem for that analysis. 
Asa Briggs is exceptional in his positive analysis of the movement as a 
formative part of a pervasive revolt against commercialisation in which „the 
Middle Ages…became the storehouse of lessons for reshaping Victorian 
economic life.‟162 Yet the most sustained examination of this movement is that 
of David Lloyd Smith,
163
 whose unpublished advanced degree thesis promotes 
the movement as both serious and influential. Smith does not mention 
environmental law, nor indeed does he mention Coleridge. But he does highlight 
its contribution to a centralised, hierarchical property theory which helps connect 
the movement with my subject matter:  
 
Young England recognised that the supreme possessor of property is the 
state [crown] to which all owe obedience. This concept, common both to 
the Middle Ages and the [nineteenth] century, never completely 
disappeared, though, for a century, it only just survived, a small and 
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spluttering flame, fed by the Romantic and Medievalist tradition, of 
which Young England was in many ways the apotheosis.
164
 
We can go further and say that in the field of environmental law this hierarchical 
approach to property exerted a very substantial influence. 
The figure who is most emblematic of the impact of this property theory 
in this setting is Algernon George Percy (1810-1899), who was, from 1867, the 
6th Duke of Northumberland.
165
 He was the „top rank‟166 within the aristocracy, 
but until now, he has not been considered by historians to have left any mark on 
the statute book. Yet in the field of the environment he most certainly did. As 
regards the innovative system of integrated pollution control under the Alkali 
Act 1881, this was the fruit of a campaign by the Northumberland and Durham 
Association for the Prevention of Noxious Vapours, of which the Duke was 
president.
167
 The Duke‟s 180,000 acres was double the landholding of the five 
other regional peers who were vice-Presidents of the organisation combined.
168
 
Earlier, the Duke sponsored in 1872 a precursor to the Rivers Pollution 
Prevention Act 1876.
169
  Beyond pollution control, the Duke was sponsor of the 
Sea Birds Preservation Act 1869,
170
 which set in train a broad body of nature 
conservation law, including the Wild Birds Protection Act 1880.  
Beyond Parliament, there are certain aspects of the Duke‟s estate 
management philosophy that cast further light on the romance of the age and its 
influence on the environment. Like many aristocrats at this time, the Duke grew 
up on an estate with grounds landscaped in neo-gothic style in the eighteenth 
century to inspire a co-operative relationship with nature. The grounds of 
Alnwick Castle were landscaped at great expense to the first Duke by Lancelot 
„Capability‟ Brown.171 The estate was lucrative as well as beautiful, but how the 
Duke invested his rental income is noteworthy. T.H.S Escott is much quoted for 
his comment that the Duke was among a millionaire elite which took „pride in 
keeping a standing balance [in West End banks] for which they never received 
six pence‟.172 This can be interpreted in different ways. One is to attach 
significance to the amount of wealth deposited. The suggestion here is that the 
Duke was ostentatiously flaunting wealth with the message that no further riches 
could mean anything to him. Another is to focus on the terms on which the 
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deposit was made. The Duke sought not growth of investment, but security. On 
this interpretation, the bank‟s job was to safely hold the Duke‟s deposit, under as 
little pressure as possible to reinvest it in profitable, potentially environmentally 
exploitative developments. „Steady state‟, rather than „growth state‟, is what this 
attitude to wealth arguably symbolises. 
To claim as I do that environmental law was the product of a resurgent 
aristocracy awaking from its Georgian complacence to grasp new (or rather old) 
romantic opportunities to steer the nation into an age of green industrialisation is 
not to ignore the potential complicity of the industrial bourgeoisie and the 
Manchester School of economics underpinning it. The business historian Pierre 
Desrocher has examined the background to corporate acquiescence with clean 
technology at this time in order to explore the extent to which the „invisible 
hand‟ had a „green thumb‟.173 Desrocher cites Dr Lyon Playfair, who asserted 
that „nothing in nature [should be regarded by the manufacturer] as worthless‟, 
and that „as competition becomes keen, these waste products may become the 
largest source of profit‟.174 However, Desrocher argues that the incentives to 
reduce waste were the result of „the institutional structure of a market economy‟. 
Green technology was „not only based on price signals and resulting profits and 
losses, but also on private property rights and the rule of law‟.175 Desrocher sees 
rule of law best reflected in the common law (of nuisance), but that is not 
inconsistent with the emphasis in this article on both common law and statute.
176
 
What is key is that environmental protection was the result of an authoritative 
imposition of legal obligations on industry. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is fascinating to reflect on the significant extent to which the first industrial 
nation valued environmental protection and the various ways in which that 
found expression in numerous laws. The foregoing examination of nineteenth 
century environmental law identifies the specific values that shaped law. It 
offers a qualified defence of Dicey‟s thesis that legal interventions were shaped 
by ideas, rather than the immediate exigencies arising from spontaneous 
problems presented by industrialisation. Dicey neglected to mention any of the 
common law and statutory provisions regarding pollution and nature 
conservation discussed above. But that was not because there was anything 
fundamentally difficult about these interventions in terms of his thesis. On the 
contrary, as Coyle and Morrow recognised, behind the veneer of a seemingly 
chaotic response to exigencies arising from steam powered industrialisation lies 
                                                 
173
 Pierre Desrochers, „Victorian Pioneers of Corporate Sustainability‟ (2009) 83 Business 
History Review 703; and „Does the Invisible Hand Have a Green Thumb: Incentives, Linkages, 
and the Creation of Wealth out of Industrial Waste in Victorian England‟ (2009) 175 The 
Geography Journal 3. 
174
 „Pioneers‟, ibid 705. 
175
 „Green Thumb‟, n 173, 12. 
176
 A purely common law approach facilitated „pollution ghettos‟ by virtue of the difficulty of 
potential claimants at this time affording litigation. Warren points to the hypocrisy of „barons‟ of 
industry who preached „the philosophy of material progress‟ from remote southern rural homes 
without thought for the northern workers „who lived in...miserable homes pinched in between 
works near expanding waste heaps and a river which was heavily polluted and often shrouded in 
smoke of chemical fumes‟ (K Warren, Chemical  Foundations (Oxford University Press, 1980) 
8.  
a body of law with firm philosophical foundations. And like Dicey, these 
scholars attach influence to the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. 
Yet the subtle adjustment that can enhance both Dicey‟s and Coyle and 
Morrow‟s analyses concerns the role of the seminal ideas of Bentham‟s 
adversary, Coleridge. Contrary to Dicey, Bentham‟s and Coleridge‟s ideas were 
not influential consecutively but, rather, they co-existed. Coyle and Morrow are 
right to have recognised the diversity of ideas shaping environmental laws, and 
in particular to have highlighted the importance of a resurgent natural law 
tradition. Certainly, John Locke is important to environmental law for the 
reasons given by Coyle and Morrow (concerning sustainable development). 
Nevertheless, the deepest engagement with humankind‟s place in the natural 
world is provided by Coleridge. Bentham supplied the rationale for evidence-
based law promoting human happiness as far as it is connected to the 
environment; Coleridge provided the justification for intuitive laws concerned 
with recognising and safeguarding „nature beauty‟. 
It is not possible to discuss in any detail the subsequent evolution of 
environmental law-making opinion. It is fairly clear that the „romance‟ of the 
law examined above in regard to Coleridge (and the Young England conduit of 
Coleridgean ideas) is at most, now, a counter-current. Strongest echo of it can be 
found in school of thought known as „wild law‟.177 That is a legal philosophy 
which stands for a radical re-orientation of human rights around common-but-
differentiated rights vesting in species within the „earth community‟.178 Without 
explicitly considering the thought of Coleridge (or Young England), wild 
lawyers advance an idea of „one world‟ that closely resembles the 
pantisocratic/stewardship ideas discussed in the foregoing. What is particularly 
compelling about this comparison is the similarity of the political contexts of the 
early nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries. Each is characterised by the 
dominance of economics.
179
 In „according totemic significance to the role of the 
market in tackling environmental problems‟,180 it is arguable that modern policy 
and law creates a climate in which romantic conceptions of environmental law 
can once again grow popular, whether or not that is a thing to be welcomed.  
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